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PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENT:
THOUGHTS ON AN EVOLVING
RELATIONSHIP
J. PETER BYRNE*

Private property is a necessary but insufficient tool for
environmental regulation. Why is it necessary? There are several
reasons. First, it settles who controls a resource, making rational
management possible. While this may sound trivial, countries with
weak or fragmented systems of ownership-or where enforcement of
law is tainted by corruption-find it impossible even to begin to
preserve resources or prevent pollution.' This is especially the case
when different individuals make conflicting claims to the same plot of
land.
Second, private property owners have the incentive to preserve the
capital value of their land. They can reap where they (or nature) have
sown. They postpone harvesting their property (by cutting a forest, for
example) until a propitious time. This choice is a cousin to
environmental protection. Private ownership involves control of
appetite and rational planning. It similarly solves the problem of open
access to a resource, which leads to destruction, because all may have
an incentive to reap but none have any incentive to sow--or even to
defer use.2
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This remains a written version of a
talk given at the annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium in February, 2004.
I extend my thanks to the Society for the invitation to speak and to the many students there
who engaged me in lively discussion.
** This essay is part of the 2004 National Student Federalist Society Symposium on
Law and Public Policy. Further discussion on the topic of "Private Law: The New Frontier
for Limited Government" can be found in the Fall 2004 issue of the Harvard Journal of
Law & Public Policy.
1. See Kristin Hite, Back to Basics: How Improved Property Rights Can Help Save
Ecuador's Forests, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 763 (2004). A chaos of conflicting

claims in a context of swirling corruption seems more environmentally destructive than the
classic "tragedy of the commons" from which most environmental reasoning begins.
2. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968). It is
central to my argument that private ownership is not the only, or always the best, solution
to overexploitation of common resources: many forms of regulation or limited common
ownership may be as good or better, depending on a host of factors. This point is
elaborated with impressive thoroughness in DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY:
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Private property owners can also be effectively regulated.
Regulators can easily locate owners of land and many other natural
resources. To the extent that the resource is valuable or the owner
competes in a market, regulators have a generally effective lever for
enforcement of laws. This obvious point is not unimportant; clear
expectations of effective enforcement are an aspect of the rule of law.
Reducing enforcement costs enhances the efficiency of regulations in
reaching public goals.
Private property generally encourages innovation by simplifying
decision-making and safeguarding the fruits of success. In some
instances, it can similarly encourage innovation in achieving
environmental goals by allowing an owner to capture the economic
benefit of the innovation. Regulatory systems that create such benefits
harness private initiative for public ends, but are themselves complex
public creations that require enormous sophistication in regulatory
agencies. 3 I will discuss this further below.
Consequently, private property may be necessary for environmental
protection in a market economy.4 Nearly everyone, however,
recognizes that property rights alone are insufficient. While an owner
may manage her land to protect the value of some economic service
or product it provides her, she may not take steps to protect its
ecological health, at least in spheres unrelated to economic return. A
farmer may assiduously cultivate a field for corn, but remain
indifferent to the consequences of destroying wildlife habitat.
Moreover, the fertilizer spread on the fields and the drainage system
for rainwater may weaken the natural health of nearby bodies of
water. 5 Owners might also rationally conclude that exhausting the
entire value of a resource immediately is more valuable to them than
preserving it, even if this eliminates options for future users.6 They

COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002).

3. See COLE, supranote 2, at 80-83 (describing technical developments that allowed the
Environmental Protection Agency to successfully oversee an emissions trading system).
4. At this point, I want to put aside the communal ownership of resources in traditional
cultures. There seems little doubt that such group rights can be efficient and stable in
certain circumstances. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C.

North eds., 1990); Henry Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in Open
Fields, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 131 (2000).
5. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LAND: ENVISIONING A

NEW LAND ETHIC (1998) (describing the relation between the prairie agriculture and water
quality).
6. This is exemplified in that classic account of the destruction of the Wisconsin forests
by private owners in JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836, 1915 (1964).
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make choices that impose costs on others without taking those costs
into account, which is the fundamental economic problem of
externalities. Environmental law starts from the recognition that: 1)
environmental benefits are public goods, so individual owners do not
have a strong incentive to produce them, and 2) legal institutions are
needed to make owners take account of the costs that they might
impose on others. A near consensus on these points seems to exist,
both in the legal academy and on this panel, although with a great
deal of pulling at the margins.
Professor Ely distinguishes between pollution control regulations,
which address harms to the public, and other regulations (such as
those preventing the destruction of privately-owned wetlands or
woodlands) that seemingly try to gain some public environmental
benefit. He argues that the former is unobjectionable because no one
has the right to use his property to harm another, a familiar principle
drawn from the common law of nuisance. Conversely, Professor Ely
reasons that regulations which attempt to achieve some public
environmental 7benefit invade the owner's rights and should require
compensation.
Professor Ely knows that the line between pollution regulations and
other regulations is terribly difficult to draw. Skilled advocates can
describe the securing of benefits as the prevention of harm, and vice
versa. 8 Let me present a hypothetical. In a certain county, pure water
flows down from an undeveloped hill, crosses a plateau, and enters
into a stream that flows into a river used by a town to supply its
public drinking water. Now imagine that market forces increase the
incentives for grazing dairy cattle, so that more cattle graze on the
plateau and eat all the grass by the edge of the stream. This allows
more runoff into the stream, degrading its quality so that its water is
not suitable for drinking without expensive treatments. Would it be
legitimate for the government to require the farmer to keep his cattle
from grazing within eight or fifteen feet of the stream, so natural
grasses will grow and filter runoff? Certainly this would prevent the
harm of allowing runoff to pollute a drinking water supply that also
serves as a habitat for fish. On the other hand, it could be said that
7. James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Environmental Regulation: The Case for
Compensation, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PQL'Y 51, 52--55 (2004). A familiar explanation for
using government regulation to address pollution is that relying on common law nuisances
would be hopeless in many cases. This difficulty stems from the large information and
collective action problems facing possible plaintiffs, as well as the technical complexities
of the factual analysis and the widespread consequences of legal remedies.
8. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).
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government is creating, on private land, a miniature environmental
reserve that amounts to a public benefit.
Both accounts are plausible descriptively, but the characterization
of a particular regulatory measure as either preventing harm or
securing a benefit is essentially a political judgment. The
characterization is normative, not factual. This judgment must reflect
perceptions of the nature of the public problem to be addressed, the
justice of the burdens placed on the owner, and views about the
proper role of government. Before the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,9 the Supreme Court accepted that such judgments, when
reasonable, could redefine nuisance limits-and hence property
rights-without requiring compensation.' 0 One glaring weakness of
the Supreme Court's current regulatory takings jurisprudence is the
disposition of the Court to address by itself these freestanding,
fundamental questions concerning the balance of public and private
authority. These are questions about which the Constitution gives no
concrete guidance and which the community ought to be able to
decide by democratic means.
Disagreements about takings decisions often involve disputes over
the nature of property. One might believe that the institution of
property has not changed in significant ways since the adoption of the
Constitution. In my view, property is a highly dynamic institution.
People today have less discretion to use land as they wish, but more
ownership over their own ideas and creations. The boundaries of rules
that confer discretion or protect against harm shift to reflect
economic, technological, and cultural factors." Despite social change,
regulatory takings law plays a more plausible role in protecting fair
transitions among property rules than in freezing a particular
conception of the boundaries of ownership as orthodox.
Ecological consciousness and environmental concern have
transformed how we think about property. While the basic ecological
insight is that creation is interconnected, some traditional notions of
property emphasize how boundaries can mark off domains
independent of each other. But property law also has always
emphasized relations, connecting people as well as protecting them
from each other. Riparian water rights are explicitly relational among
9. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
10. See, e.g., Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
11. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1446-49 (1993).
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upstream and downstream users. Nuisance law provides an owner the
right not to be harmed unreasonably by another owner's land use. The
doctrine of waste governs relations between the present tenant and
remainderman in a life estate, providing for intergenerational equity.
Co-owners have always had duties toward each other. A host of
common law property principles are relational in this sense.
Modem environmental and land use regulations extend the
protective aspects of common law property developed in light of an
increased awareness of how one person's land use affects another. We
may not recognize the continuity because property rules today are
more likely to appear in the form of statutes and regulations than
common law rules announced in judicial decisions. The Clean Air Act
and the District of Columbia Historic Preservation Act, for example,
provide property rules. Property, like all modem law, employs the
legal technology of the twentieth century: statutes, regulations, and
their attendant procedures. These tools permit the law to attend to a
broader and more complex range of interests and to involve more
people in legal decision-making. Thus, the Clean Air Act effectuates
the public's interest in the atmosphere and protects our rights against
harm in a way that would be impossible at common law. It does not
merely declare the public to be the owner and await common law
litigation between factory owners and the public, however. The Act
instead prescribes complex but pragmatic rules that reflect scientific
uncertainty and our fallible political process.
Thus, environmental regulations appear to be a part of the property
system, rather than external to it. They give form to rights and duties
in resources to all sorts of persons. They broaden the idea of
ownership by protecting people who do not own property in the
traditional sense, but also narrow it by making more private decisions
subject to public control. Insisting on the traditional jurisprudential
distinction between private and public law leads to a serious
misunderstanding of contemporary law, where various sources and
forms of law overlap and intertwine.
Of course, acknowledging that we need not accept the image of a
bipolar struggle between property and regulation does not mean that
serious substantive disagreements about how rights and duties should
be structured for any resource at any time and place will disappear.
Various values and interests will inform deeply held beliefs, but such
clashes should not obscure the remarkable consensus on the need to
balance appropriately a vital sphere of economic liberty. This sphere
will foster efficiency and creativity, with the prohibitions that protect
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public health and ecological resources. Those debating this issue
should focus on specific disputes about facts and values, rather than
masking themselves in misleading ideological claims about an
apocalyptic clash between property rights and environmental
protection. We need to find a language for debate in the public sphere
that allows us not only to maintain our deeply held beliefs about
ultimate values, but also to speak with each other in a manner that
forges workable conclusions on specific matters.
Some commentators have argued that cost-benefit analysis
provides such a neutral language, through which priorities can be set
and real benefits and costs identified. 12 Conversely, Lisa Heinzerling
and Frank Ackerman persuasively demonstrate how cost-benefit
analysis, as it is commonly understood, both understates the harms of
pollution and exaggerates the costs of regulation. 13 More
fundamentally, it provides a specious precision to broad value
judgments that actually suppress serious discussion of relevant issues.
Professors Heinzerling and Ackerman argue that a more
straightforward discussion of competing concerns would lead to better
decision-making and results. At a minimum, their analysis indicates
the difficulty of forging a usable language for environmental debate.14
One area where there has been something of a rhetorical
convergence is the championing of market-based, property-like
approaches to environmental protection. 15 Embodying "ecological
services"-such as maintaining wetlands that purify water or provide
wildlife habitat, or granting permission to emit air pollutants in rights
that can be bought and sold-these approaches offer the promise of
less contentious environmental improvements at a lower cost to the
regulated owners.16 Such approaches may also disaggregate
12. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Orderfor Improving
FederalRegulation?A Deeperand Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489,
1498-503 (2002).
13. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLNG, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).

14. One might hope for constructive engagement in a political debate where the
participants speak a language that can be understood and replied to by a wide range of
other people, even where many hold quite different comprehensive values or orientations
-

rather in the spirit of JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press

1993).
15. See Gregory S. Alexander, Propriety Through Commodity: Why Have Legal
Environmentalists Embraced Market-Based Solutions?, in PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE
21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 75-78 (Harvey Martin Jacobs ed.,

2004).
16. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 2, at 79-83; James Salzman et al., ProtectingEcosystem
Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310-19 (2001). Peter
Menell has shown how market-based approaches have reduced municipal solid waste
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ideological conflict, so that parties can straightforwardly bargain
about the costs and benefits of particular problems and solutions. For
example, the farmer who is paid for providing a migratory bird habitat
may come to see himself or herself as a dignified partner in a public
enterprise that he or she can embrace.' 7
A bargain or arrangement between parties could create an overall
positive result in my earlier hypothetical about preventing grazing too
close to a river that flows into a municipal water supply. For example,
the city might purchase, or condemn with compensation, an easement
along the banks that keeps grazing animals away and perhaps results
in the cultivation of native plants that provide a healthy buffer
between the river and pasture. The farmer should more readily agree
to the easement than he would to regulation without compensation,
and his rate of compliance over time might even be higher. Another
benefit of purchasing an easement, rather than laying down a uniform
regulation, is that one can provide differing degrees of restriction to
different sites based on the effects they might have on the water. For
example, one site that is badly eroded and slopes toward the river
might be addressed immediately, but another where the farmer's use
of her land is less threatening, or where the contour leads away from
the river, might remain free from legal imposition. The enhanced
ability to treat different conditions on individual bases may increase
both fairness and efficiency. At this point, one moves rather close to
the world for which Professor Ely argues.
The creation of markets for trading air pollution permits under the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments represents the most innovative use
of property norms to achieve environmental goals. The Amendments
directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish
limits on total emissions of certain pollutants below current levels and
distribute pollution permits. These permits gave heavy polluters the
option to maintain their emissions at current levels or trade the right
to pollute among themselves. Those who could reduce the emission of
pollutants at the lowest cost could profit from the sale of permits to
others who faced higher costs. By most accounts, the program has
been a large success, achieving greater reductions at lower costs than
had been estimated. It introduces the force of competition into the
property equation, encouraging participants to compete to see who
beyond all expectations. Peter Menell, An Economic Assessment of Market-Based
Approaches to Regulating the Municipal Solid Waste Stream (forthcoming).
17. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics? 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
175, 193-201 (2003).
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can reduce pollution faster at the lowest cost. At the same time, it
allows each participant to devise its own method for reducing
pollution from each source.
How would such a runoff trading system work for the previously
mentioned hypothetical riparian farmer? It does not add substantial
benefit to the simpler purchase of easements described earlier. The
most basic problem is that a trading system requires sophisticated
monitoring systems to determine how much pollution (or runoff) each
participant is producing, systems that are a large investment for the
hypothetical city. Small farmers are unlikely to invest much in
innovations to reduce runoff at lower cost. Moreover, the group of
farmers involved probably would be too small to produce a
competitive market for permits. Perhaps it would be more logical to
return to the simpler property-based system of purchasing easements
along the river from the farmers.
Still, there are more problems with this scenario than the
hypothetical initially acknowledged. How should the city acquire
these easements? There is no commercial market for them. The city
could approach each farmer and negotiate a price, but that process
would be costly in itself. Moreover, this would create an incentive for
holdouts that would increase the total cost if the city were unable to
obtain adequate reductions in runoff without complete participation.
The city might resort to its eminent domain power, but that also
entails high costs, both in litigation and in bitterness. What would be
the price? Perhaps it should be measured by the fair market value of
the additional pasturage-the traditional measure in eminent domain
of what the owner has lost. 18 Viewed as such, the price could rise
rapidly without netting the harms that the farmer imposed on others. It
might still be sensible for the city to purchase the easements somehow
if the cost of doing so, including payments, transaction costs, and
administrative costs, would be less than the cost of alternate methods
of obtaining clean water, such as building a filtration plant near the
city. Yet, all of this could be much more expensive than simply
forbidding the farmers from allowing their cows near the water,
sweetened, perhaps, by offering them money for fencing.
This situation raises a great concern. There is probably not enough
public money in the world to purchase all the environmental
protection that is needed. Professor Ely suggests that this may reflect
the fact that the public does not support environmental restrictions as
18. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-12 (1979).
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much as it seems they do. 19 This explanation is too simple, however.
Environmental benefits, such as clean air and abundant wildlife,
usually do not put money in people's pockets for purchasing those
benefits. They are public goods that are free to all once they are
created. My hypothetical presents a case where the clean river is not a
pure public good because the cleanliness of the water affects citizens'
water rates. Consequently, there may be cash benefits to finance the
acquisition. This is an unusual example, intended to highlight the
general rule that environmental benefits do not produce cash.
Environmental problems are characterized by the widely-dispersed
effects of pollution or ecological degradation, the scientific
complexity of their causes, the severity of their consequences, and the
long timeframes within which they may operate. 20 Such issues pose
insurmountable problems for private bargaining to address. They also
make difficult the political mobilization of such large, diffuse citizen
groups, few of which can capture concrete benefits for themselves.
Specific environmental regulations may be wrongheaded, but the
overall endeavor exemplifies a collective reaching for a distinct
public interest that has few parallels in our polity.
There are moral hazard problems when one pays for preventing
pollution or obtaining ecological services. If farmers are rewarded for
not polluting the river, does it not give every farmer an incentive to
become, or at least threaten to become, a polluter? This may be most
acute when the city pursues a selective purchase plan as described
above, buying easements only at the most degraded spaces. Now only
those who create public threats receive payment for their efforts,
while farmers who care voluntarily for the public river receive
nothing. Still, the problem is general and creates strategic
opportunities. A gentleman farmer with no interest in development
may threaten to subdivide environmentally sensitive land, induce an
offer to purchase most of the land in fee or a conservation easement,
and continue to live happily in the middle, having lost nothing he
wanted but also having enriched himself. This seems to be something
of a problem now with private purchases of development rights, but it
could escalate dramatically if the government used such schemes as a
primary vehicle for conservation. Additionally, there is a large and
unacknowledged problem with the lack of monitoring and
enforcement of the terms of conservation easements.
There is also a more fundamental concern. Paying people not to
19. Ely at 54.
20. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16-42 (2004).
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harm the environment obscures a basic issue of morality: polluters
ought to pay for the harm they cause or bear the cost of pollution
abatement. This principle captures a duty that we all bear toward
creation and has shaped our environmental law since the first Earth
Day. It both fosters a vision for restoring healthy ecosystems and
serves as a deterrent to actions that degrade the environment. In
addition, this principle captures the notion that property rights do not
include the unlimited right to convert land and water from their
natural function to support life. Environmentalists are not likely to
abandon this as a general approach, nor should they. They may view
payment as expedient in particular instances, but fear that payment
over time may undermine the obligatory nature of the duty to take
care of the world that we all share. 2' On the other hand, establishing
patterns of beneficial behavior and rewards may help to establish and
promulgate the moral attractiveness of that behavior.
Given this ethical anchor, environmentalists need to think hard
about when they should support the recognition of property rights as a
way to reduce environmental harm. Should the northern forests of
New England be protected primarily through the purchase of
development rights or through regulation? Can mercury pollution be
addressed though emissions trading, as the Bush Administration
currently proposes, when mercury is highly toxic and remains
concentrated near the plants that emit it? While there may be
troubling cases for purchasing environmental benefits, there are also
cases where it seems entirely appropriate. Such cases include the
following: where public management of a resource would be
preferable, where public access should be secured, where the resource
has a unique character, where time is of the essence, or where
effective private competition to produce an environmental benefit can
be gained. In addition to sorting out where purchases are appropriate,
theorists have only begun to think about how easements and other
purchases should be coordinated with regulations for maximum
protection at the lowest cost to both owners and the public.
One can anticipate that the shape of property rights will continue to
evolve in light of environmental concerns, economic change, and
legal innovations. This evolution will resonate with our deepest hopes
and fears regarding social values, whether they emphasize individual
21. John Echeverria has forcefully argued that paying for conservation benefits may
undermine arguments against regulatory takings claims by reshaping "reasonable
expectations." John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying to Achieve Conservation
Purposes (Jan. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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liberty or harmony with nature. It is important, however, to meet in
contexts where people can debate reasonably specific remedies for
real problems. The future of property and of the living world will be
forged there.
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